Abstract. This paper addresses the question of how often the square code of an arbitrary l-dimensional subcode of the code GRS k (a, b) is exactly the code GRS 2k−1 (a, b * b). To answer this question we first introduce the notion of gaps of a code which allows us to characterize such subcodes easily. This property was first stated and used in [10] where Wieschebrink applied the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack [8] to brake the Berger-Loidreau cryptostystem [1] .
Introduction
The notion of a Public-Key Cryptosystem (PKC) was first introduced in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman in [3] . Most PKC are based on hard number-theoretic problems such as integer factorization (like the RSA cryptosystem) or taking discrete logarithms in finite groups (like the El Gamal cryptosystem).
In [5] McEliece introduced the first PKC based on the theory of errorcorrecting codes which resist precisely the attacks to which the RSA and El Gamal cryptosystem are vulnerable. This property makes McEliece scheme an interesting candidate for post-quantum cryptography (see [7, 2] for an overview of the state of the art). Later, Niederreiter presents a dual version of the previous cryptosystem which is equivalent in terms of security (see [4] ). In its original paper [6] Niederreiter proposed the class of Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes over F 2 m . However, Sidelnikov and Shestakov in [8] introduced an algorithm that, in polynomial time, permits us to discover the structure of the secret GRS code used in the cryptosystem. Therefore, the initial Niederreiter scheme is completely broken.
That is why Berger and Loidreau in [1] propose another version of the Niederreiter scheme which is designed to resist the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack. The main idea of this variant is to work with subcodes of the original GRS code rather than using the complete GRS code.
However, in [9] Wieschebrink presents the first feasible attack to the BergerLoidreau cryptosystem that allows us to recover the secret key if the chosen subcode is large enough, which is impractical for small subcodes. Furthermore, in [10] Wieschebrink notes that if the double code of a subcode of a GRS code of parameters [n, k] is itself a GRS code of dimension 2k−1 (what he says that seems to happen with high probability) then we can apply the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack and thus reconstruct the secret key in polynomial time.
The main task of this paper is to confirm the previous question and give a characterization of the possible parameters that should be used to avoid attacks on the Berger-Loidreau cryptosystem.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First we give a brief review of basic concepts from Coding Theory that are relevant to this work and thus establish the notation that will be used throughout the paper. Furthermore, after discussing about the basic attributes and structure of GRS Codes we introduce the non-gap sequence associated to subcodes of such codes and we define some properties that characterize these subcodes in terms of this sequence. The final result of this section even allows us to count the number of subcodes of a GRS code if we identify all possible associated non-gap sequence.
The main objective of the second section is to study the probability that an arbitrary subcode of a GRS code is itself a GRS code. To achieve our goal it would be enough to analyze the non-gaps sequences associated to subcodes with the required properties, which provides an upper bound on the number of such subcodes and, consequently, we could estimate the probability of the occurrence that we are looking for.
Finally we introduce the square code of a subcode of a GRS code. Wieschebrink in [10] stated that this code is often a GRS code. In the last section we give some clues on how to solve this question but the final result will appear in a subsequent paper. However, we establish some properties that the non-gap sequence of the analyzed subcode must verify to have a square code which is a GRS code and has dimension 2k − 1. Therefore, the weak subcodes for the Berger-Loidreau cryptosystem are completely characterized.
In order to shorten this abstract we will show all the results without proofs.
Gaps of a code
Let us start fixing the notation and introducing some basic definitions and some known results from coding theory. Let F q be a finite field with q elements and let n, k ∈ N such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n ≤ q.
We define the set
Then for each a, b ∈ F n q the evaluation map at these elements is given by:
We will denote the map ev a,b by ev a if b is the all one vector. For all vector b ∈ (F q \ {0}) n this evaluation map is injective, since f ∈ L k has at most k ≤ n zeros.
Let a be a vector of mutually distinct elements of F q and b a vector consisting of n nonzero entries of F q then the generalized Reed-Solomon
That is, for every codeword c ∈ GRS k (a, b) there exists a unique polynomial f c ∈ L k , known as polynomial associated to c, such that c = ev a,b (f c (X)).
For a, b ∈ F n q we define the Schur or star product a * b ∈ F n q by:
From now on, let l be an integer such that 1 ≤ l ≤ k ≤ n ≤ q then C denotes an l-dimensional subcode of the code GRS k (a, b) and we denote by
We have the following nice embedding property:
The next Proposition show us how to identify all the (a, b) non-gaps of any l-dimensional subcode of the code GRS k (a, b).
We define an associated (a, b) non-gap sequence of C by
Using the previous characterization proposition we have the following result that allows us to define any subcode C ⊆ GRS k (a, b) as the subspace generated by polynomials in F q [X] whose degree is an element of the associated (a, b) non-gap sequence of C. Corollary 1. Let C be an l-dimensional subcode of the code GRS k (a, b) with associated non-gap sequence I(C). Then:
Furthermore applying elementary operations to the above result we obtain a basis of any l-dimensional subcode C ⊆ GRS k (a, b) just studying the associated (a, b) non-gap sequence of C.
Proposition 2.
There is a set I consisting of the strictly increasing sequence of non-negative integers i 1 , . . . , i l and there are polynomials f 1 , . . . , f l in the unique normal form
such that the evaluation of these elements with respect to (a, b) form a basis of the code C. Furthermore I(C) = I and dim(C) = |I(C)|.
Therefore Proposition 2 allows us to count the number of l-dimensional subcodes C by identifying all possible associated non-gaps sequences (i.e. analyzing all subsets of the set of integers {0, . . . , k − 1}). 
where i 0 = −1. Then the number of l-dimensional subcodes of the code GRS k (a, b) over F q with a given non-gap sequence I is equal to q e(I) .
The number e(I) is minimal and equal to 0 for I = {0, 1, . . . , l − 1} and it is maximal and equal to l(k − l) for I = {k − l, . . . , k − 2, k − 1}.
Accordingly to a well-known result and by Proposition 3 we have that the number of l-dimensional subcodes of the code GRS k (a, b) over F q is equal to the Gaussian binomial:
Hence this number is polynomial in q with non-negative integers as coefficients.
GRS subcodes of GRS codes
In this section we study the particular case of l-dimensional subcodes C of the code GRS k (a, b) that are themselves GRS codes. The simplest case is when C = GRS l (a, b) with 2 ≤ l ≤ k. The result presented bellow characterize uniquely such subcodes. Another special case is when C = GRS l (a, a i * b) with i+l < k. The following results allow us to give an upper bound on the number of such subcodes.
Proposition 5. Let i l be the largest non-gap of C and let c = ev a (f (X)) for
Let us define a i by induction: a 0 = 1, a 1 = a and a i+1 = a * a i .
Note that the converse is not true in general.
Corollary 4. The number of l-dimensional subcodes of the code GRS k (a, b) over F q with l consecutive non-gaps is equal to
Now we consider the general case i.e. we consider C = GRS l (c, d) an ldimensional subcode of the code GRS k (a, b). First we give the necessary conditions that C must verified to be a subcode of the code GRS l (a, b) and how is its associated non-gap sequence. Then, with an additional assumption, we show the converse (which are the necessary conditions that the associated non-gap sequence of C must verified to be a subcode of the code GRS k (a, b)). With these two results we can give an upper bound on the number of such subcodes. 
If 2k − 2 < n and l ≥ 2, then there is a converse of the above Proposition given by the following result. 
Corollary 5. If 2k − 2 < n and 2 ≤ l ≤ k. Then the number of l-dimensional subcodes of the code GRS k (a, b) over F q that are a GRS code is at most q k−l+3 .
With the previous assumptions i.e. let 2 ≤ l ≤ k and 2k − 2 < n ≤ q, then Corollary 5 and Proposition 3 imply that the probability that an arbitrary l-dimensional subcode of the code GRS k (a, b) is a generalized Reed-Solomon code is at most
This fraction tends to zero for k → ∞ or (k − l) → ∞.
4 The square of a code Now let C be an l-dimensional subcode of the code GRS k (a, b), let r 1 , . . . , r l be the rows of a generator matrix of C and let f 1 , . . . , f l be the polynomials associated to those rows, then r i * r j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , l} has the form:
That is, the code D = C * C := r i * r j : 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ j is a subcode of the code GRS 2k−1 (a, b  *  b) .
Similarly to what we did in the previous section we denote by
In this case
Define the following set of non-gaps
From now on we assume that k, l are integers such that 2 ≤ l ≤ k ≤ n ≤ q and 2k − 1 ≤ n. Next Proposition shows the relationship between the (a, b) non-gap sequence associated to the subcode C, i.e. I(C), and the (a, b * b) non-gap sequence associated to the square code D, i.e. J (D). Otherwise let i 1 , i l be the first and last element, respectively of the (a, b) non-gap sequence of
Proposition 8. I(C)
However, the previous equality does not hold in general.
The aim of this section is to obtain a characterization of the l-dimensional subcodes C of the code GRS k (a, b) such that its square code is exactly the code GRS 2k−1 (a, b * b).
The first possibility occurs when C is itself a GRS code. The following two results are related to this special case.
In particular, GRS 2l−1 (a, b * b) is the square of the code GRS l (a, b). 
Remark 2. If the square code of C is equal to GRS 2k−1 (a, b * b), then:
1. The special case t = 0 of Proposition 11 implies that 2k − 1 ≤ l+1 2 which is in agreement with Proposition 10. 2. The cases t = 2k − 2, t = 2k − 3 and t = 2k − 5 imply that i l = k − 1,
Remark 3. If I(C) = {k − l, . . . , k − 1}, then this non-gap sequence satisfies the conditions of Proposition 11 for all t. However not all the square codes of a subcode C of the code GRS k (a, b) with such associated non-gap sequence are exactly the code GRS 2k−1 (a, b * b). A case example is the subcode
Assume that we have two polynomials f (X), g(X) ∈ L k , that is, both polynomials can be written as:
with f r , g s ∈ F q for r, s ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. The product of these polynomials give us another polynomial in L 2k−2
This can be expressed in matrix form as follows:
where R(f ) is a matrix of size (2k − 1) × (3k − 2) over F q with the following form:
and S(g) is a matrix of size 1 × (3k − 2) over F q with
). Now let C be an l-dimensional subcode of the code GRS k (a, b) with associated (a, b) non-gap sequence I(C) = {i 1 , . . . , i l } then by Proposition 2 there exists l polynomials f j ∈ L k for j ∈ {1, . . . , l} in normal form of degree i j such that C = ev a,b (f 1 (X)), . . . , ev a,b (f l (X)) .
Furthermore we know that the elements ev a,b * b (f u (X)f v (X)) generate the double code of C, denoted by D with 1 ≤ u ≤ v ≤ l.
If we denote by g uv (X) = g uv0 + g uv1 X + · · · + g uv(2k−2) X 2k−2 ∈ L 2k−1 the polynomial obtained by multiplying the polynomials f u and f v for 1 ≤ u ≤ v ≤ l then the following matrix is a generator matrix of the square code D. 
